New FAQs added – Transneft ports, payments and insurance
OFSI
OFSI has published new FAQs (188-195) clarifying how UK financial sanctions apply in relation to Transneft and associated activity. These FAQs provide additional guidance to industry on how relevant prohibitions operate in practice, including when a licence may be required and how firms should approach compliance risks.
The FAQs respond to stakeholder queries and aims to support a consistent understanding of the regime, helping to reduce the risk of circumvention. We encourage insurers, financial institutions and maritime operators to review the guidance and ensure internal processes reflect these considerations.
Banking services: inclusion on a United States sanctions list is not sufficient, on its own, for a refusal to open an account
Court of Justice of the European Union
The Slovenian court made a reference to the Court of Justice. It wishes to know, inter alia, whether the bank’s refusal was justified under EU law. 4
In response, the Court states, first of all, that any consumer residing legally in the European Union has the right to open and use a payment account with basic features. However, that right is subject to compliance with the rules
relating to the prevention of money laundering and the countering of terrorism.
The mere inclusion of a customer’s name on the OFAC list, or on any other list of that type drawn up by a third country, does not automatically prohibit a bank from establishing a business relationship with that customer. That inclusion may nevertheless constitute one of the relevant factors which the bank is required to take into account during an individual assessment of the risk of money laundering and terrorist financing.
Seven members of major Islamic State financing network convicted
Europol
Europol supported the Belgian authorities in the successful conclusion of a complex counter-terrorism investigation, targeting an international network primarily composed of individuals of Chechen origin residing in Europe. The network was found to be deeply radicalised and actively engaged in supporting and financing the activities of the so-called Islamic State terrorist organisation.
During the operation, Belgian counter-terrorism units uncovered and dismantled a sophisticated infrastructure involving terrorism financing, cryptocurrency-based money laundering, and facilitation networks. The targeted network was involved in financing the release of Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs) detained in conflict zones such as Syria, as well as providing financial support to members of the so-called Islamic State in Syria and Central Asia.